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“Mark My Words”—Trademarks and
Fundamental Rights in the EU
Jens Schovsbo*
This Article analyses the new provisions in EU law that
trademark rules should be “applied in a way that ensures full respect for
fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the freedom of
expression.” It is pointed out how these provisions are part of a broader
trend of “constitiutionalization” in EU law whereby courts increasingly
rely on fundamental rights when they interpret the rules of Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR). After a presentation of the historical and
legislative background for the changes and the related development in
copyright law, the likely impact of the new trademark rules is discussed.
It is concluded that even though the constitutionalization is not going to
revolutionize EU trademark law, it will require courts to consider in a
more pronounced way the interests of users of trademarks (such as artists
or commercial users) vis-à-vis trademark holders’ interests. This in turn
may affect the way courts interpret trademark law, and, in particular,
give more room to the limitations and exceptions. The effects of such a
development may be to limit the ability of trademark holders to push
exclusivity in ways that harm cultural development, public debate, and
fair competition.
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INTRODUCTION
When the EU rules on trademarks were recently amended, a new provision
was added to the Recitals. It is now provided that trademark rules should be “applied
in a way that ensures full respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the
freedom of expression.”1 On the face of it, this is hardly surprising. Of course,
trademark law is not and has never been either above or beyond the reach of
fundamental rights such as the free speech.2 Looking closer, however, it becomes
clear that the explicit mentioning of fundamental rights in the trademark rules reflects
developments both in trademark law and in fundamental rights law. Regarding
trademark law the need to address these concerns explicitly has arisen because of

1. Commission Regulation 2017/1001 of 16 June 2017 on the European Union Trade Mark
(consolidated version) O.J. (L 154) 1–99, point 21 [hereinafter Trademark Regulation or Regulation];
Directive 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015,
to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trademarks, O.J. (L 336) 1–26, point
27 [hereinafter Trademark Directive or Directive]. The Regulation takes effect from 1 October
2017. Cf. art. 212. The Directive should be implemented in national law by 15 January 2019. Cf. art. 54.
2. For the following, I take “fundamental rights” to include those rights and freedoms
which are recognized in the European Convention on Human Rights, see European Convention on
Human Rights, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.echr.coe.int/pages/
home.aspx?p=basictexts [https://perma.cc/WY8S-4HNU] ( last visited June 10, 2018), and in
particular the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 55 O.J. (C 326) 391–407. I focus
on the Charter since this has been described in Allan Rosas, Five Years of Charter Case Law: Some
Observations, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS A BINDING INSTRUMENT: FIVE
YEARS OLD AND GROWING 12–20 (Sybe de Vries et al. eds., 2015), as having “become the main point
of reference in the post-Lisbon case law.” Also, the Charter in the words of the EU Commission
brought together “in one text all the fundamental rights protected in the Union, spelling them out in
detail and making them visible and predictable.” Strategy for the Effective Implementation of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM (2010) 573 final (Oct. 19, 2010). By way of example
the Charter includes the following provisions: Article 8 Protection of Personal Data; Article 10 Freedom
of Thought, Conscience and Religion; Article 11 Freedom of Expression and Information; Article 13
Freedom of the Arts and Sciences; Article 16 Freedom to Conduct a Business; Article 17 Right to Property;
Article 48 Presumption of Innocence and Right of Defence; and Article 54 Prohibition of Abuse of Rights.
According to Article 51(1), the Charter is binding not only on the EU but also on the EU countries when
they are implementing EU law. A provision in the Charter cannot be applied by itself but needs the
existence of a least one relevant rule of EU law other than a Charter provision. Rosas, supra note 2.
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the expansion of trademark law beyond its historical starting points. In a time when
trademark law primarily served to prevent consumer confusion regarding the
commercial origin of goods or services and only words or figures were accepted as
being protectable (if non-descriptive), the potential for conflicts with fundamental
rights such as free speech was limited because only commercial uses in a narrow
sense had the capability of constituting infringements. As trademark law developed,
however, and protection for marks with a reputation was granted even against nonmisleading uses and new types of marks such as colours became accepted, the
potential for conflicts increased because a broader area of uses became potentially
covered by trademark law’s reach. At the same time, fundamental rights law has
expanded in the sense that during the later years the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) and national courts have engaged in a general reconfiguration of the
interface between Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and fundamental rights with a
more pronounced role of arguments based directly on fundamental rights in IPR
cases.3
This contribution describes the legal background for the new trademark
provisions and tries to predict their effects on future case law from the CJEU and
courts in EU countries. It first explains how EU law has so far dealt with the
interface between IPR in general and fundamental rights, and then zooms in on
trademark law.4 It will be pointed out, how the new provisions are part of a general
trend towards a more pronounced reliance by courts on fundamental rights norms
in IPR cases (called a constitutionalization of IPR) and that the recitals will most likely
accelerate this trend. The constitutionalization is not going to revolutionize
trademark law, but it is likely to fuel an evolution of EU trademark law which will
challenge traditional perceptions (e.g., of the role of exceptions and limitations), and
generally make trademark analyses more receptive towards augments from users of
trademarks.5
3.
4.

See infra point 2.
For a general introduction, see CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Edward Elgar ed., 2015). For the EU-dimension, I
recommend in particular Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence
of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 371 (2006) [hereinafter Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law?];
Christophe Geiger, Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 115 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2015)
[hereinafter Geiger, Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension]; Jonathan Griffiths,
Constitutionalising or Harmonising? The Court of Justice, the Right to Property and European Copyright
Law, 38 EUR. L. REV. 65 (2013); Tuomas Mylly, The Constitutionalization of the European Legal Order:
Impact of Human Rights on Intellectual Property in the EU, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 103 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015). Specifically on
trademarks, see Lisa P. Ramsey & Jens Schovsbo, Mechanisms for Limiting Trademark Rights to Further
Competition and Free Speech, 44 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 671 (2013);
Martin Senftleben, Free Signs and Free Use – How to Offer Room for Freedom of Expression Within the
Trademark System, in GEIGER, supra note 4, at 354; Martin Senftleben et al., Recommendation on
Measures to Safeguard Freedom of Expression and Undistorted Competition in EU Trademark Law,
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 337 (2015).
5. See infra Part 5.
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I. IPR AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Traditionally, fundamental rights and IPR have been seen as sharing the same
goals and values. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Harper & Row described
copyright as an “engine of free expression”6 and the EU-Charter simply states that
“Intellectual property shall be protected [as property].”7 Also the IPR system itself
is thought to have taken account of the overall societal interests including those
recognized by fundamental rights most notably via its rules on, for instance, (i)
protected subject matter, (ii) duration, (iii) scope of protection, and (iv) limitations
and exceptions. Even though the potential for conflict between trademark law and
fundamental rights has historically not been as pronounced as for most notably
copyright (in part for the reasons stated above), trademark law has traditionally done
so too. On the most general level, trademark law could be said to increase freedom
of expression and information simply by expanding the “market in language.”8
More to the point, Martin Senftleben explains how the rules in EU trademark law
which limit protection to only signs which are distinctive, impose a post-registration
use requirement on holders, or which in other ways limit exclusivity promote a
public domain which offers “a reservoir of unprotected and protected signs that are
available for political, artistic and commercial speech.”9
6. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1958).
7. See EU Charter art. 17(2). The right to property is stated in EU Charter art. 17(1):
Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired
possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest
and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation
being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far
as is necessary for the general interest.
As pointed out in Christophe Geiger, Intellectual Property Shall Be Protected!? Article 17(2) of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: A Mysterious Provision with an Unclear Scope, 31
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 113 (2009), it is important to bear in mind that the protection of IPR is not
“absolute,” but according to subparagraph 1 may be limited and regulated in the “public”/“general”
interest. Geiger, Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension, supra note 4, at 134. See also Universal
Declaration on Human Rights art. 27(2) (“Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(1)(c) (“The States Parties to
the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: To benefit from the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”).
8. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30
J.L. & ECON. 265, 271 (1987) (noting also that these benefits are small).
9. Senftleben, supra note 4, at 355; see also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights
and Expressive Values: How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Ambiguity, in TRADEMARK LAND AND
THEORY – A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 261 (Edward Elgar ed., 2008) (according
to whom related principles in US only work in theory). On the ‘public domain’ in trademark law, see
also Jennifer Davis, Protecting the Common: Delineating a Public Domain in Trade Mark Law, in
TRADEMARK LAND AND THEORY – A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, supra note 9, at
345. In the Municipality of Oslo, Case E-5/16, Judgment, The Court of Justice of the European Free
Trade Association (Apr. 6, 2017), the Court explained that protecting works of art which constitute
prominent parts of a nation’s cultural heritage as trademarks after the lapse of copyright protection may
be perceived by the average consumer in the EEA state in question as offensive and therefore as
contrary to accepted principles of morality (¶ 92). If the national authority finds this to be the case, the
application for trademark protection should be refuse. See First Council Directive 89/104/EEC, of the
European Council of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to
Trade Marks, 1988 O.J. (L 40) art. 3(1)(f) [hereinafter 1989-Directive]. The Court relies in part on what
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Despite the commonalities between IPR and fundamental rights, there has
traditionally been little interference or room for interaction at the level of
substantive law between the two areas of the law. Helfer and Austin thus report
how fundamental rights and IPR have traditionally been preoccupied with their own
distinct concerns and have not seen the other as either adding or threatening its
sphere of influence or opportunities for expansion.10 By way of example, they point
out how the mother of all IPR’s internal limitations and exceptions11 (i.e., the threestep test originating in the Berne Convention)12 contains no references to
fundamental rights.13 As seen from a traditional perspective, this is hardly surprising
given that the international IPR treaties are based on the concept of minimum
protection and are not primarily concerned with the way these rights are limited or
function within the national systems vis-à-vis the nationals of the state.14 At the
same time, it reflects a two-pillar view of IPR and fundamental rights.
A. IPR and Fundamental Rights in the EU
In recent years, the starting point described above has become blurred and the
two areas of the law are becoming more and more aware of each other (paraphrasing
it perceives as a need to protect the public domain which it declares to “entail the absence of individual
protection for, or exclusive rights to, a work” (¶ 66). The judgment is discussed in Martin Senftleben,
Vigeland and the Status of Cultural Concerns in Trade Mark Law – The EFTA Court Develops More
Effective Tools for the Preservation of the Public Domain, 48 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION
L. 683 (2017) (pointing out for instance that the decision represents an unusually firm determination
to defend the public domain). These limitations have also been acknowledged in the international
IPR-conventions. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 15
(excluding descriptive signs); Id. art. 17 (allowing for limitations for the fair use) [hereinafter TRIPS].
These rules and principles are binding on the member countries, including the EU-countries and the
EU. Regarding these important provisions and free speech, see generally Lisa Ramsey, Free Speech and
International Obligations to Protect Trademarks, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 405 (2010).
10. LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 31, 31 et seq (2011). The authors point out how this
starting point is “curious” given the fact that the close relationship between IPR and human rights has
been spelled out clearly in basic international legal instruments. Id. at 31. See supra note 7 for such basic
international legal instruments.
11. Annette Kur, Limitations and Exceptions Under the Three-Step Test – How Much Room to
Walk the Middle Ground?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM
208, 212 (Edward Elgar ed., 2011). I take these two expressions (limitations and exceptions) to be
interchangeable.
12. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 9(2), Sept. 28, 1979.
TRIPS restated the test for copyright (Article 13) and extended it to apply to patents too (Article 30).
For trademarks, TRIPS contains a “two-step-test” in Article 17: “Members may provide limited
exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that
such exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third
parties.”
13. JORGEN BLOMQVIST, PRIMER ON INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS
182 (Edward Elgar ed., 2014) interestingly points out how the three-step-test in the Berne Convention
mirrors Article 4 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16
December 1966, which was adopted just a year previous to the 1967-revision of the Berne Convention,
which introduced the three-step-test. The framers of the Berne Convention were thus very much aware
of the development in fundamental rights law, and the lack of cross-references, therefore, should be
seen as a deliberate choice.
14. Id. at 17; Kur, supra note 11, at 216.
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Helfer and Austin).15 At the international level, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA), for example, expressly states that the enforcement procedures
should be implemented in a manner that “avoids the creation of barriers to
legitimate activity, including electronic commerce, and, consistent with that Party’s
law, preserves fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair process, and
privacy.”16 Even though that Agreement has not so far entered into force, it reflects
an attempt to combine the two systems in a way which is very different when
compared to the traditional IPR conventions.17 A similar trend is visible in Europe.
Beginning in national case law,18 the CJEU has in more recent cases been drawing
on external constitutional norms when interpreting IPR legislation including the
internal balancing norms such as exceptions and limitations.19 In this way, it is
becoming clear that even though there are still walls between IPR and fundamental
rights, the walls are found within the same house and doors exist and open both
ways to allow the passage of legal norms and arguments from one legal system to
the other.
The full ramifications of this process—aptly coined as the constitutionalization
of IPR by Geiger20—for EU IPR in general and for trademark law in particular
remain to be seen. Already, however indications of the potential of the
constitutionalization for the interface between IPR and fundamental rights law can
be observed in EU copyright law. A good example of this is provided by the
decision of the CJEU in Deckmyn.21 As explained by the European Copyright
Society in its comment to the decision, the CJEU in this way implicitly rejected the
traditional, continental European view of limitations and exceptions as being

15. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 10.
16. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement art. 27(2), Oct. 1, 2011.
17. In the same vein, see Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons
Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, June 27, 2013 (e.g. the first recital of
the Preamble (recalling the principles of non-discrimination, equal opportunity, accessibility and full
and effective participation and inclusion in society, proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities)).
18. See, e.g., Andreas Rahmatian, Trade Marks and Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 335 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2015); Ramsey & Schovsbo, supra note 4; Katia
Weckström, The Lawfulness of Criticizing Big Business: Comparing Approaches to the Balancing of Societal
Interests Behind Trademark Protection, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 671 (2007).
19. Similarly for EU-competition law, which Advocate General Jääskinen has called “EU’s
economic constitution” in Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA v. Evonik Degussa
GmbH et al., Case C-352/13, Opinion, Court of Justice (Dec. 11, 2014). According to the case law of
the CJEU, competition law may be relied upon as the basis for compulsory licenses of IPR but only in
exceptional circumstances. See IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. NDC Health GmbH & Co., Case C-418/01,
Judgement, Court of Justice of the European Union [CJEU], point 38 (Apr. 29, 2004); Radio Telefis
Eireann (RTE) et al. v. Indep. Pub. Ltd. (ITP) et al., C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Judgment, Court of
Justice of the European Union [CJEU] (Apr. 6, 1995); see also Jens Schovsbo, Fire and Water Make
Steam: Redefining the Role of Competition Law in TRIPS, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A
FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM, supra note 11.
20. Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law?, supra note 4.
21. Deckmyn v Vandersteen et al., Case C-201/13, Judgement, Court of Justice of the
European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132 (Sept. 3, 2014).
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“restrictively delineated.”22 Rather than basing itself on traditional IPR reasoning—
the Opinion goes on—the CJEU chose to adopt the view of the European Court
of Human Rights that any exception to the right to freedom of expression, including
copyright, must itself be interpreted narrowly. Thus, the constitutional-based
reading of the limitations and exceptions has the potential to turn the analysis
upside-down; if one sees exclusivity as the exception (and not as the main rule) then
the limitation (which (re)introduces the freedom of information prohibited by
exclusivity) represents the base line.23 As seen from such a perspective, it is thus not
possible to indicate a general principle of interpretation in favour of the main rule
since it is not a priori clear, which is the main rule (exclusivity or freedom of
information). Consequently, the constitutionalization provides courts with
arguments that may affect their application of the existing statutory law.
In the most recent phase of EU harmonization, the traditional lines between
IPR and fundamental rights have become even more blurred.24 This contribution
focuses on the new trademark Regulation and Directive but similar provisions are
found in the recently adopted Directive on trade secrets25 and the proposal for a
new copyright Directive.26 Fundamental rights, in other words, are becoming
internalized into EU IPR and will, therefore, constitute an explicitly integrated part

22. Christophe Geiger et al., Limitations and Exceptions as Key Elements of the Legal Framework
for Copyright in the European Union – Opinion on the Judgment of the CJEU in Case C-201/13 Deckmyn,
46 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 93, points 23–27 (2015). For more on the European
traditional style of interpretation, see generally MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND
THE THREE-STEP TEST – AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC
COPYRIGHT LAW 6 (2004) (on copyright).
23. Jens Schovsbo, Constitutional Foundations and Constitutionalization of IP Law - A Tale of
Different Stories?, 7 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER GEISTIGES EIGENTUM [INTELL. PROP. J.] 383 (2015).
24. See infra Part 4.1.1.
25. Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the
Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their
Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1–18. Particularly relevant is id. point 19
(“While this Directive provides for measures and remedies which can consist of preventing the
disclosure of information in order to protect the confidentiality of trade secrets, it is essential that the
exercise of the right to freedom of expression and information which encompasses media freedom and
pluralism, as reflected in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the
Charter’), not be restricted, in particular with regard to investigative journalism and the protection of
journalistic sources.”).
26. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright
in the Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final (Sep. 14, 2016). Particularly notable are id. point 4,
and the Proposed Directive, point 45 (“This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes
the principles recognized in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Accordingly, this Directive should be interpreted and applied in accordance with those rights and
principles.”), and id. point 46 (“Any processing of personal data under this Directive should respect
fundamental rights, including the right to respect for private and family life and the right to protection
of personal data under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
and must be in compliance with Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
and Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.”) (footnotes omitted). For
an example from patent law, see Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Parliament, 2001 E.C.R. I-7149, ¶ 70
(“It is for the Court of Justice, in its review of the compatibility of acts of the institutions with the
general principles of Community law, to ensure that the fundamental right to human dignity and
integrity is observed.”).

Final to Printer_Schovsbo (Do Not Delete)

562

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

8/30/2018 10:37 AM

[ Vol. 8:555

of the IPR legislative system. For this reason, courts will no longer only rely on
fundamental rights in exceptional cases where the internal balancing tools fall short.
Instead, courts are going to rely on such norms in all instances since the norms have
become part of the legal framework itself. The precise effects of this development
are hard to predict. European Union trademark law has arguably been rather
successful so far in striking the right balance between trademark exclusivity and—
say—artistic freedom of expression. By way of example, it was hardly a coincidence
that Louis Vuitton, in the much-commented-on Dutch case, relied exclusively on
EU design law rather than trademark law to try to prevent an artist (Nadia Plesner)
from using their design/trademark as part of an artwork (called Simple Living).27
Whereas design law protects broadly against any “use” of the design (including use
of the design for artistic purposes and as a symbol rather than on a product) it would
seem to have been clear from the outset to the company, that such use did not fall
foul of trademark law. Be that as it may, because of the expansion described above
and infra and the lack until the recent amendment of provisions in trademark law
which clearly exempts artistic use of trademarks from legal challenge, EU trademark
law poses opportunities for aggressive holders of marks with a reputation to push
exclusivity beyond its reasonable limits. Holders may for example claim that the use
of their mark as a prominent part of a painting is commercial, uses the mark in a
way that could be perceived as an indicator of source, and constitutes an unfair
exploitation of the mark.28 This may cause a chilling effect on artistic uses which
involves trademarks. Furthermore, the potential areas of conflict seem to be rising.
The same factors which have made trademarks more and more important as
communicative tools for companies have thus also increased their cultural, social,
and commercial importance for users who, for various reasons, need access to
trademarks in order to engage in activities which are generally recognized as being
beneficial to society either by promoting cultural development, public debate, or
fair competition.29 Users in this sense include a disparate group, and their interests
may be driven by different motives. As seen from a cultural perspective, artists have
for long used trademarks as part of their artwork (apart from Nadia Plesner just

27. Judgment of the District Court of The Hague of May 4, 2011, 389526 / KG ZA 11-294,
Nadia Plesner Joensen v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BQ3525 (Neth.). The court
balanced the fundamental right of Louis Vuitton to peacefully enjoy its property right (i.e. design right)
against the use of the design and the artist’s protection with regard to her artistic freedom. The court
found that the artist was allowed to use LV’s design of a multicolour canvas as applied to one of its
own expensive handbags as part of a drawing called Simple Living where the LV-bag was being carried
by a malnourished African child (together with a ‘Paris Hilton-dog’). By the same token, even the use
of the same drawing as the motive on a T-shirt was allowed under design law. The artist explained that
the bag was used as a symbol and as part of an attempt to draw attention to what she believed was
a problematic difference in attention given to celebrities and to the famine, which was going on in
Darfur. See Judgment point 4.8. For a discussion of the case, see Lucie Guilbaut, The Netherlands:
Darfurnica, Miffy and the Right to Parody!, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC
COM. L. 236 (2011), and Jani McCutcheon, Designs, Parody and Artistic Expression – A Comparative
Perspective of Plesner v Louis Vuitton, 41 MONASH UNIV. L REV. 192 (2015).
28. See infra Section 5.1.1.
29. See Dreyfuss, supra note 9.
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think of Andy Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup Cans30 or James Bond’s well-known
fondness for Bollinger champagne). Political use includes satirical uses such as when
a non-governmental-organisation (NGO) wants to criticise the oil company and
uses E$$O31 or the use by an anti-smoking organisation of a parody of a Marlboro
advertisement to bring across an antismoking message.32 Commercial access to
someone else’s trademark may be necessary in order to simply present one’s own
products as alternatives (“If you like ‘brand X’ you’d love my brand too”), to
indicate their use (“This part fits with ‘brand X’”), or to resell original products
bearing the trademarks of third parties such as second hand goods or parallel
imports. Importantly, the scope of fundamental rights norms in the EU is very
broad and goes beyond traditional civil rights such as free speech (e.g., use to
express criticism, parodies, or reviews). By way of example, EU law also recognizes,
for example, the Freedom to conduct a business as a fundamental right.33 In this way, a
broad variety of users are potentially able to defend themselves against trademark
holders by arguments based on fundamental rights. Adding to the blurring of the
interface between fundamental rights and IPR is, therefore, a certain Trojan Horse
quality of the reference to “fundamental rights.” In addition, to being a very wide
legal concept, “fundamental rights,” the boundaries for the individual rights and
freedoms, are constantly evolving and they develop often via case law, which is
totally unrelated to IPR.
II. EU HARMONIZATION OF TRADEMARK LAW
A. Generally
The EC and later the EU legal order have found it hard to balance the
territorial nature of trademark law with the market integration goals of the
Community/Union. A first round of harmonization blew through trademark law
(and indeed IPR in general) in the 1970s and 1980s. As part of this process, the
CJEU34 relied on the provisions in the Treaty35 on the Free Movement of Goods
to eradicate restrictions to intra-community trade arising from the territorial nature
of the uncoordinated national trademark acts in place at the time. As notable results,
a principle of regional exhaustion (“first sale”),36 a rocky relationship between EU
30. Campbell’s Soup Cans, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campbell%27s_
Soup_Cans [https://perma.cc/4FSZ-Y3AM] (last visited June 10, 2018).
31. See Esso v. Greenpeace France, Cour d’appel [CA] [Regional Court of Appeal] Paris, 4e
ch., Nov. 16, 2005, 04/12417, reprinted in [2006] E.T.M.R. [Europ. Trade Mark Rep.] 53 (U.K.).
32. See Re the Parodying of Cigarette Advertising, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice] Apr. 17, 1984, Case VI ZR 246/82 (Ger.), reprinted in [1986] E.C.C. 1, 6–7.
33. Cf. EU Charter art. 16.
34. Until entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the Court was called The Court of
Justice of the European Community.
35. The founding treaty has been amended over the years, but the rules on the Free Movement
of Goods have remained in place since the 1958 Treaty of Rome (formally the “Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community”).
36. Case 15/74, Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 1974 E.C.R. 1148 (patents); Case 16/74,
Centrafarm v. Winthrop, 1974 E.C.R. 1184 (trademarks).
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law, and national laws according to which EC law would only restrict the exercise of
national IPR but left the existence of those rights untouched37 were established. In
the subsequent and second round of harmonization in the late 80s and mid-90s,
common rules were passed. For trademark law this led to the passing of the First
Council Directive to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to
trademarks in 198838 (1989-Directive) and the Regulation on Community
trademarks in 1993.39 The scope of the 1989-Directive was “limited to those
national provisions of law which most directly affect the functioning of the internal
market”40 and created an obligation for Member States to implement the provisions
of the Directive in their national Trademark Acts.41 The Regulation created a freestanding unitary right which was issued by a newly established, transnational,
regional Trademark Office (“OHIM” (what is now the EUIPO))42 and enforced
nationally via dedicated “EU trademark courts.”43 As it will be seen in the following,
the ongoing round of harmonization combines elements from the first two rounds
and sees a continued active CJEU applying constitutional norms to interpret the
directives and regulations.
B. The Expansion of Substantive Trademark Law
As seen from a traditional trademark law perspective, the result of the
harmonization in the 80s and 90s was an expansion of the scope of trademark law
and a strengthening of the legal position of trademark holders. By way of examples:
the Regulation established an extra layer of cheap and readily available European
Community -wide protection based on a single application and administered by a
new regional Trademark Office,44 new types of marks were recognized (including
colours and the shape of goods),45 protection for marks with a reputation was
granted even if no risk of confusion is involved,46 and a principle of regional
37. E.g., Case 192/73, Van Zuylen Frères v Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R. 732, 743–44, ¶¶ 6–8, 15
(HAG I).
38. 1989-Directive, supra note 9, at 1. The directive was later amended and the official and
codified version is now Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
October 2008 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks (Codified
version), 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25–33.
39. Council Regulation 40/94 of Dec. 20, 1993, on the Community Trade Mark, 1994 O.J. (L
11) 1 [hereinafter 1994-Regulation] (the Regulation was subsequently amended and the last version
before the present Regulation was Council Regulation 207/2009, Feb. 26, 2009, on the Community
Trade Mark (codified version), 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1).
40. 1989-Directive, supra note 9, at point 3.
41. The new Directive also aims to provide a more comprehensive harmonization than the
previous one, includes new aspects of procedural rules, and has made some formerly facultative
provisions mandatory (notably the protection of marks with a reputation). See Trademark Directive,
supra note 2, at points 7–13.
42. See generally EUIPO: EUR. UNION INTELL. PROP. OFF., https://euipo.europa.eu/
ohimportal/en
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180509165522/https://euipo.europa.eu/
ohimportal/en] (last visited May 9, 2018).
43. See 1994-Regulation, supra note 39, § 2.
44. Id.
45. 1994-Regulation, supra note 39, art. 4.
46. Id. art. 9.
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exhaustion gave right holders new ways of restricting parallel importation of goods
which had been put on the market for the first time by the trademark holder or with
its consent in a third-country.47
In the ensuing case law, the main focus of the (as it later became) CJEU was
“to prevent the protection afforded to the proprietor varying from one State to
another” and “to eliminate disparities between the trademark laws of the Member
States which may impede the free movement of goods and the freedom to provide
services and distort competition within the common market.”48 In the same vein, it
was stated that the rule on exhaustion embodied “a complete harmonization” of the
regional principle as this was the only interpretation which was fully capable of
ensuring that the purpose of the Directive is achieved, namely to safeguard the
functioning of the internal market.49 Of course, the CJEU did not develop
trademark law without any recognition of trademark law’s overall role as a part of
the general legal system to protect “undistorted competition.”50 In early decisions,
the Court emphasized the public interest underlying the trademark provisions,
which aimed at keeping descriptive signs or indications51 or signs consisting
exclusively of the shape of the product necessary to obtain a technical result52
outside of trademark protection to be freely used by all. In important decisions, the
CJEU also indicated concern about the risks of extending trademark protection, for
example, by making it clear that protection should not by itself confer “an
unjustified advantage for a single trader,”53 and that trademark law offers no
protection “against practices inherent in competition.”54 Still, the overall effect of
the development of the CJEU’s practice was to the benefit of trademark holders.55
This also affected the way the limitations and exceptions were used. For example,
in Gillette,56 the CJEU was asked to decide if and to what extent the seller of nonoriginal blades that fit Gillette’s razor handles could use the Gillette brands on its
packaging. The seller argued its use of Gillette’s marks to indicate the product’s
intended purpose was in accordance with “honest practices” and thus was permitted
under Article 6 of the Directive. The Court, however, interpreted the limitations in
the Directive narrowly, stating that the “honest practices” requirement in Article 6

46.

47.
48.

Id. art. 13.
Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Matthew Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10299, ¶¶ 45–

49. Case C-355/96, Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1998 E.C.R. I-4822, ¶¶ 25–27.
50. Case C-10/89, SA CNL-SUCAL NV v. HAG GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. I-3711, ¶ 13 (Hag II).
51. Joined Cases C-108/97 & C-109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee, 1999 E.C.R. I-2810, ¶ 25.
52. Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I5490, ¶ 79.
53. Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux Merkenbureau, 2003 E.C.R. I-3822, ¶ 54.
54. Case C-323/09, Interflora Inc v. Marks & Spencer Plc, 2011 E.C.R. I-8625, ¶ 57.
55. E.g., Annette Kur, Trade Marks Function, Don’t They? CJEU Jurisprudence and Unfair
Competition Principles, 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 434 (2014); Martin Senftleben,
Trademark Protection – A Black Hole in the Intellectual Property Galaxy?, 42 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 383, 383 (2011).
56. Case C-228/03, Gillette Company v. LA-Laboratories Ltd., 2005 E.C.R. I-2337.
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“in substance [constitutes] the expression of a duty to act fairly in relation to the
legitimate interests of the trademark owner.”57 As I have argued elsewhere with Lisa
Ramsey, while the “honest practices” language thus could be perceived as
permitting open-ended balancing of the interests of the mark holder, competitors,
and the public in a trademark dispute, this interpretation of Article 6 in Gillette
provides for one-way-only flexibility to consider solely the interests of rights
holders.58 The Gillette decision in this way illustrates how the gravitational forces of
EU trademark law were tending to the trademark holders’ interests.59 The climax
for this development arguably came in L’Oréal v. Bellure where the CJEU explained
that the protected functions of a mark are not limited to the origin function, but
include other functions such as “guaranteeing the quality of the goods or services
in question and those of communication, investment, or advertising.”60 Even
though the CJEU has so far relied on the functional analysis in a limited number of
instances, and only to restrict the scope of the so-called “double identity” rule,61 the
broadness of the protected functions have arguably left trademark holders with
amble and strong arguments for further pushing the development their way.
C. Summing Up
To sum up this very brief overview of EU trademark law: the development in
the case law of the CJEU, based on the legal reforms in the 1980s and 90s, was an
overall tendency for the Court to further the internal market and the economic effects of
trademark and to develop the law primarily with a view to the interests of incumbent
trademark holders. Importantly, the expansion in terms of the rights and protection
offered to trademark holders was not matched by a similar development in terms
of the rights and protection of users (private and/or commercial). Until the recent
amendments (discussed below), the catalogue of limitations and exceptions had not
been touched. It was against this basis that when the trademark system of the EU
was being reformed, a call was issued for a new limitation infrastructure that could
ensure a balanced application of resulting norms in the future vis-à-vis the societal

57. Id. ¶ 49.
58. See Ramsey & Schovsbo, supra note 4, at 676 (referring to the CJEU’s narrow interpretations
of the statutory limitations in Case C-48/05, Adam Opel AG v. Autec, 2007 E.C.R. I-1034, ¶¶ 18, 22
and Case C-558/08, Portakabin Ltd. v. Primakabin BV, 2010 E.C.R. I-6963).
59. Id.
60. Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185, ¶ 58. The case and the
functionality analysis have been widely debated. See Kur, supra note 55; see also Martin Senftleben,
Function Theory and International Exhaustion: Why it Is Wise to Confine the Double Identity Rule in EU
Trademark Law to Cases Affecting the Origin Function, 36 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 518 (2014).
61. The provision is found in the 1989-Directive, supra note 9, art. 5(1)(a). According to Recital
11, the protection in such instances is “absolute.” However, the CJEU has consistently made clear that
protection under this rule is limited to instances in which a third party’s use of the sign affects or is
liable to affect the functions of the trademark. L’Oréal, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185. In this way the protection
is made conditional on the effect on a function and is not “absolute.”
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interests in freedom of expression and competition.62
IV. THE NEW EU TRADEMARK RULES
For the present purposes, the most important (but not the only)63 novelty is
the following Recital in the Preamble of the new EU trademark Regulation:64
(21) The exclusive rights conferred by an EU trademark should not entitle
the proprietor to prohibit the use of signs or indications by third parties
which are used fairly and thus in accordance with honest practices in
industrial and commercial matters. In order to create equal conditions for
trade names and EU trademarks in the event of conflicts, given that trade
names are regularly granted unrestricted protection against later
trademarks, such use should be only considered to include the use of the
personal name of the third party. It should further permit the use of
descriptive or non-distinctive signs or indications in general. Furthermore,
the proprietor should not be entitled to prevent the fair and honest use of
the EU trademark for the purpose of identifying or referring to the goods
or services as those of the proprietor. Use of a trademark by third parties
to draw the consumer’s attention to the resale of genuine goods that were
originally sold by or with the consent of the proprietor of the EU trademark
in the Union should be considered as being fair as long as it is at the same
time in accordance with honest practices in industrial and commercial
matters. Use of a trademark by third parties for the purpose of artistic
expression should be considered as being fair as long as it is at the same time

62. Senftleben et al., supra note 4; see also Annette Kur, Fundamental Concerns in the
Harmonization of (European) Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAND AND THEORY – A HANDBOOK
OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 151, 176 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008).
63. The new Directive/Regulation introduced some minor changes in terms of the substantive
provisions. Some of these changes aimed at bolstering protection, e.g., in regard to goods in transit
(Regulation art. 9(4)) or to geographical indications (Regulation art. 8(4a)). Others are pushing in an
opposite direction and will likely benefit users of trademark-protected products; most notably a novel
limitation for the purpose of identifying or referring to goods or services as those of the proprietor of
that trademark was introduced (Regulation art. 12). This limitation covers, e.g., the use of a third party’s
trademark for selling that party’s used goods or for selling parallel imported goods, i.e., the “doubleidentity-”situation. In the same vein, Recital 18 of the Directive now makes it clear that an infringement
of a trademark can only be established if there is a finding that the infringing mark or sign is “used in
the course of trade for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services.” The use of marks for, say,
decorative purposes or the accidental use of a mark cannot constitute an infringement.
64. A similar provision is found in the new Directive, point 27. The 1989-Directive did not
include similar wording. Instead, it contained a provision in Recital 7 that the EU rules do not “exclude
the application to trademarks of provisions of law of the Member States other than trademark law, such
as the provisions relating to unfair competition, civil liability or consumer protection.” Even though
not excluding the application of provisions of fundamental rights, such as free speech, such interests
are clearly not on the mind of the drafters of this Recital. The Trademark Directive should be fully
implemented on January 15, 2019. See 1989-Directive, supra note 9, arts. 54–55. Since the Regulation
entered into force already on March 23, 2016, the legal situation is a bit chaotic and will remain so until
the Directive has been put into effect. One would expect national courts, however, to pay very close
attention to the Regulation since the rules and provisions there will soon become effective regarding
national trademarks too.
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in accordance with honest practices in industrial and commercial matters.
Furthermore, this Regulation should be applied in a way that ensures full respect
for fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the freedom of expression.65
Recital 21 covers a number of different issues and topics, which all have in
common that they aim to indicate limits for trademark exclusivity. In this way, the
Recital could be seen as answering the call mentioned above for a stronger
limitations infrastructure to match the expansion of trademark law. The first part
of the Recital provides for limitations but only to the extent that the use by third
parties is fair and in accordance with honest practices in industrial and commercial
matters.66 The application of fundamental rights and freedoms is not, however,
made subject to the “fair and honest practices” test. Instead, this part constitutes a
freestanding test (cf. the use of the word “furthermore”). This is also the effect of
the use of the opening word—”furthermore”—and by the adjective “full respect.”
It thus follows from the wording of the Recital itself that these interests should be
taken into account when applying any rule or principle of trademark law (see more
infra) including the definition of which uses are “fair” and in conformity with
“honest practices.”
The process which eventually led to the adoption of the new Regulation and
Directive in December 2015, began in 2009 when the EU Commission initiated a
review of the EU trademark system.67 Following this, a first proposal was published
in 2013.68 The references to fundamental rights (and artistic expression) now found
in Recital 21 of the Trademark Regulation were not included in the original
proposal. Instead, they were introduced late in the legislative process and without
much further ado.69 In fact, the provision has hardly left any trace at all and very
little interpretative aid can be found in the traveaux préparotoire. The important MPI
Study from 2011, which was commissioned by the Commission and contains an
extensive study of the trademark rules including a comprehensive stakeholder
analysis, did not foresee any mentioning of fundamental rights.70 Nor did the 2013
Commission proposal, which aimed only at certain uses within the traditional
framework of trademark law and the overarching concept of “honest practices in
industrial and commercial matters.”71 This included a new limitation on referential
use (which was eventually adopted, see infra) but contained no reference to

65. Trademark Regulation, supra note 1, at preamble (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. Trade Mark Protection in the EU, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/
industry/intellectual-property/trade-mark-protection_en [https://perma.cc/52U5-A5TY] (last visited
June 10, 2018).
68. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Council
Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community Trade Mark, COM (2013) 161 final (Mar. 27, 2013).
69. Directive 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015
to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1, 4.
70. See MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP. & COMPETITION LAW, STUDY ON THE
OVERALL FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN TRADE MARK SYSTEM 120 (2011).
71. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Council
Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community Trade Mark, supra note 68, at 4, 13.
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fundamental rights (nor to artistic use).72 A suggestion to add fundamental rights
and freedoms was first made by the Committee on Legal Affairs73 and later backed
up by the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection.74 In its first
reading on February 25, 2014, the European Parliament suggested to incorporate
these concerns via an express limitation aimed at parody, artistic expression,
criticism, or comment.75 In the subsequent process, however, this suggestion was
not followed. Instead it was agreed to amend the recitals and insert the wording
mentioned above and to not address the matter directly in the substantive
provisions.76 Unlike a substantive law provision (such as an Article), the provisions
found in the recitals do not normally create legally binding rights. Instead, courts
rely on recitals to cast light on the interpretation of a legal rule.77
A. The Constitutionalization of Trademark Law
The new Recitals in the Preamble on fundamental rights confirm and reflect
a general trend of constitutionalization of IPR in EU law. As described above this
process involves a more direct involvement of constitutional norms in the
interpretation and application of IPR than previously known. Furthermore, Geiger
points out how a constitutional dimension enables (perhaps even forces) courts to
integrate concerns and values which have not been expressed directly in the
traditional IPR into their analysis. This could in turn help courts focus more on the

72. Id. at 4 (“The exclusive rights conferred by a European trademark should not entitle the
proprietor to prohibit the use of signs or indications which are used fairly and in accordance with honest
practices in industrial and commercial matters. In order to create equal conditions for trade names and
trademarks in case of conflicts against the background that trade names are regularly granted
unrestricted protection against later trademarks, such use should be considered to include the use of
one’s own personal name only. It should further include the use of descriptive or non-distinctive signs
or indications in general. Moreover, the proprietor should not be entitled to prevent the general fair
and honest use of the European trademark for identifying or referring to the goods or services as those
of the proprietor.”).
73. Draft Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community Trade Mark, European Parliament,
Comm. on Legal Affairs, at 5–7 (Oct. 31, 2013).
74. REGINA BASTOS, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, COMM. ON THE INTERNAL MKT. &
CONSUMER PROT., 2013/0088(COD), OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNAL MARKET
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION FOR THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS ON THE PROPOSAL
FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL AMENDING
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) NO 207/2009 ON THE COMMUNITY TRADE MARK 7 (2013),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE516.700+03+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN [https://perma.cc/3LUM-A9CN].
75. European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 25 February 2014 on the Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 207/
2009 on the Community Trade Mark, 2017 O.J. (C 285) 209, 219–20.
76. Council of the European Union, Statement of the Council’s Reasons, 2013/0088 (COD),
10373/1/15 REV 1 ADD 1, 1, 6–7; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, at
4, COM (2015) 589 final (Mar. 27, 2013).
77. See, e.g., Case C-215/88, Casa Fleischhandels-GmbH v. Bundesanstalt für
Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, 1989 E.C.R. 2799, 2808.
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general societal effects of the protection and on maintaining an appropriate balance
between different interests.78
The CJEU has dealt with IPR and Fundamental Rights in a number of
judgments. So far, most of these have concerned copyright.79 In the following, I will
mention only some examples. Even though copyright cases are arguably more prone
to arguments based on free speech because of copyright’s subject matter, one would
expect the general principles developed by the CJEU to apply generally within all
fields of IPR. The concrete analyses depend of course on the boundaries set up by
the specific legislation including, for instance, the detailed limitations and
exceptions found in the legislation in question.80 For this reason, I will first describe
the development in copyright law and then turn to trademark law.
1. The Example of Copyright
In 2006, the CJEU found in Laserdisken that a provision which restricted
parallel importation from third countries of copyright protected material81 did not
violate the principle of freedom of expression.82 In so finding the Court explained
that the rule does not prevent copyright holders from communicating their ideas
but rather to control the first marketing of the object protected by the right.83 The
important point, as seen from a constitutional perspective, is not the actual result
but the way the CJEU framed its assessment of the validity of the exhaustion rule
under the general balancing principle established by ECHR Article 10 on Freedom
of Expression.84 In this way the Court implicitly accepted the relevance of that
78. See Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law?, supra note 4, at 371 et seq..
79. See Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014; Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel
Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, 2014; Cases C-457/11 to C-460/11,
Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort (VG Wort) v. Kyocera, 2013; Case C-283/11, Sky Österreich GmbH
v. Österreichischer Rundfunk, 2013; Case C-180/11, Bericap Záródástechnikai Bt. v. Plastinnova 2000
Kft., 2012; Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA
(SABAM) v. Netlog NV, 2012; Case C-277/10, Luksan v. Van der Let, 2012; Case C-145/10, Painer
v. Standard Verlags GmbH, 2011; Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs,
Compositeurs et Éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. I-12006; Case C-275/06, Productores de
Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-309; Case C-479/04,
Laserdisken ApS v. Kulturministeriet, 2006 E.C.R. I-8089. For an in-depth analysis and a (then) fullhistory account, see Mylly, supra note 4, at 110.
80. As a notable example of the general character of the constitutionalization, Case C-170/13,
Huawei Technologies Co. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 (on competition law and standard essential patents)
indicated as a starting point for its analysis that a balance should be struck between maintaining free
competition and the requirement to safeguard that proprietor’s intellectual-property rights guaranteed
by Article 17(2), ¶ 57.
81. The rules on exhaustion are found in Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related
Rights in the Information Society [2001] OJ L 167/10, art. 4.
82. Laserdisken, 2006 E.C.R. at I-8131.
83. Id. at I-8130.
84. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference
by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it
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provision for the evaluation of the provision in copyright. By way of inference it
also accepted that it might have found the provision in the Directive to be
unjustified in the light of the balancing principle contained in Article 10. The Court
in this way recognised, at least in principle,85 that it would be able to use the
(external) fundamental right (in casu the ECHR Article 10) to second guess the
(internal) balancing of the copyright legal instrument. In Promusicae86 from 2008, the
Court found that the EU rules only impose limited obligations on Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) to communicate personal data in order to ensure effective
protection of copyright. The CJEU explained87 that the case raised the need to
reconcile different fundamental rights, viz. the right to respect for private life on the
one hand,88 the rights to protection of property,89 and to an effective remedy.90 To
reconcile those interests, the CJEU instructed national courts to “take care to rely
on an interpretation of the directives which allows a fair balance to be struck between
the various fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order.”91 In
particular, courts should not just interpret national laws in a manner consistent with
EU directives. They should also make sure that they do not rely on an interpretation
of them “which would be in conflict with those fundamental rights or with the
other general principles of Community law, such as the principle of
proportionality . . . .”92 Not only is the balancing test and the principle of
proportionality introduced as the basic way of reconciling the different interests. It
is also explained that the balancing test should, furthermore, be applied in a way
which makes it clear that the need to secure the “effective protection of copyright”
(i.e., the fundamental right to property)93 does not trump the interests inherent in
protecting the communication of personal data (i.e. the fundamental right to
effective judicial protection94 and the protection of personal data and of private

carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.”).
85. On the other hand, unlike the Advocate General in the case, the Court never engaged in
any substantive discussion but simply stated that “the alleged restriction on the freedom to receive
information is justified in the light of the need to protect intellectual property rights.” Opinion of
Advocate General Sharpston, Case C-479/04, Laserdisken ApS v. Kulturministeriet, 2006 E.C.R. I8093, I-8108–09. According to Mylly, supra note 4, at 112, Laserdisken represents the “culmination of
the rejection and ignorance period [of the CJEU] in IP matters.”
86. Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España
SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-309, ¶ 65.
87. Id. ¶ 68.
88. Id. ¶ 65 (this right is recognized in the EU Charter, art. 8).
89. Id. (i.e., EU Charter, art. 17).
90. Id. (i.e., EU Charter, art. 47).
91. Id. ¶ 68 (emphasis added).
92. Id.
93. Id. ¶ 62.
94. Id.
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life).95 Safeguarding copyright as a fundamental right in other words does not take
priority, but is just one interest amongst other equally important interests. Next, in
2011, in Scarlet Extended,96 the Court rejected that the EU rules on enforcement of
copyright vis-à-vis ISPs require them to install all-encompassing filtering systems.
The CJEU remarked inter alia that
The protection of the right to intellectual property is indeed enshrined in
Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(‘the Charter’). There is, however, nothing whatsoever in the wording of that
provision or in the Court’s case-law to suggest that that right is inviolable and must
for that reason be absolutely protected.97
Instead the protection of the fundamental right to property, which includes
the rights linked to intellectual property, must be balanced against the protection of
other fundamental rights98 with a view of striking “a fair balance between the
protection of copyright and the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals
who are affected by such measures.”99 The latter includes the freedom to conduct
a business enjoyed by operators such as ISPs pursuant to Article 16 of the
Charter.100 In UPC Telekabel101 from 2014, the CJEU explained that in deciding
whether or not to grant injunctions prohibiting ISPs from allowing customers’
access to web-sites containing copyright infringing material, national courts should
balance the involved interests as these have been expressed though the rules on
fundamental rights and other general principles such as the principle of
proportionality.102 As explained in Scarlet, those interests include Article 16 which,
according to the Court, includes inter alia “the right for any business to be able to
freely use, within the limits of its liability for its own acts, the economic, technical
and financial resources available to it.”103 Consequently, an injunction which
imposes grave costs or other disproportional burdens on IPSs would not be
justified.104 Furthermore, the Court explained that an ISP, in choosing the measures
to be adopted in order to comply with an injunction, should include the interests of
the users in using the provider’s services in order to “lawfully access information.”105
Failing to take the interests into account as part of the balancing would, the Court
explained, not take due account of the “freedom of information” of the users.106
95. Id. ¶ 63.
96. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs
SCRL (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. I-12006.
97. Id. ¶ 43 (emphasis added).
98. Id. ¶ 44.
99. Id. ¶ 45.
100. Id. ¶ 46.
101. Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, 2014.
102. Id. ¶ 46.
103. Id. ¶ 49; see generally Gustavo Ghidini & Andrea Stazi, Freedom to Conduct a Business,
Competition and Intellectual Property, in GEIGER, supra note 4, at 410 (discussing Article 16 of the EU
Charter).
104. Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, ¶¶ 52, 53.
105. Id. ¶ 56.
106. Id.
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The national court must check that these limits are respected.107 Remarkably, the
CJEU here relies on the fundamental right of freedom of information to impose
obligations on a private party (the ISP) vis-à-vis another private party (the user).108
Finally, yet importantly, in the 2014 case, Deckmyn,109 the Court linked the existence
of the exception on parodies in the Infosoc Directive to the Charter. The Court
explained that the exception should be interpreted in a way which enabled the
effectiveness of the exception thereby established to be safeguarded.110 Also the
interpretation should strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, the interests
and rights of right holders and, on the other, the freedom of expression of the user
of a protected work who is relying on the exception for parody.111
2. Summing Up
As it can be seen, the CJEU, in all these decisions, in one way or the other,
factored arguments based on fundamental rights norms into the assessment of the
legality or effects of the IP legislation. In this way, the external fundamental rights
norms have come to serve, at the same time, as legitimizing the IPR norms and as
instruments of interpretation of the internal IPR rules. The traditional two-pillar
approach112 is corroding. The central mechanism in the decisions from the CJEU,
is the balancing of interests.113 As explained by Griffiths the term “balancing” should
be understood merely as a metaphor for a process which involves a detailed exercise
of comparison between the requirements of competing interests.114 Unlike a
traditional IPR analysis, the constitutional balancing uses fundamental rights norms
to frame the issues and as the basis for finding the relevant arguments.115 As seen
in this perspective, the weight on the right holder’s side of the scale is provided by
the right to property.116 On the other side of the scale, one might find the right to
freedom of expression117 or the freedom to conduct a business.118 The nature of
the interests and their weights cannot, however, be gauged once and for all but must
be determined through a case-by-case analysis. This open-endedness lies at the very
heart of the test. Another part is the turning about of the base line for assessing which

107. Id. ¶ 57.
108. See Geiger, Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property, supra note
4, at 150 et seq. (seeing these remarks as a constitutionally based push towards the recognition of “users’
rights”).
109. Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014.
110. Id. ¶ 23; see also Case C-174/15, Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken v. Stichting Leenrecht,
2016 ¶ 51 (on the public lending limitation).
111. Case C-201/13, Deckmyn, 2014 ¶ 27.
112. See supra point 2.
113. See supra notes 91, 92.
114. Griffiths, supra note 4, at 74.
115. See supra point 2.1.
116. Griffiths, supra note 4, at 71; Schovsbo, supra note 23. The textbook example from design
law is Judgment of the District Court of The Hague of May 4, 2011, 389526 / KG ZA 11-294, Nadia
Plesner Joensen v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BQ3525 (Neth.).
117. EU Charter art. 11(1).
118. EU Charter art. 16.
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is the main rule (exclusivity or freedom of information) and which the limitation
(injunction or access to use) as identified above, point 2.1 which makes any a priori
assumption about a narrow or broad interpretation of the limitations problematic.
Accepting balancing as the basis of a legal analysis is thus to accept that cases cannot
be decided based on deduction or with reference alone to IPR systematic
concerns.119 This is also the gist of the dictum in Scarlet that IPR is “not inviolable”
and must not be “absolutely protected.”120
V. IMPACT ASSESSMENT
A. Generally
The new Recitals have confirmed that trademark law is part of the broader
trend of constitutionalization. The more pronounced role of constitutional norms
in trademark law proper is most likely going to serve as a catalyst for trademark
analysis simply by opening the normative space and forcing courts to hear new types
of arguments in trademark cases. Thus, Geiger has identified a number of general
advantages in recognizing fundamental rights as a foundation for the IP system
including:
 Fundamental rights are included in the national constitutions and bind
the legislature,
 the legislature has to consider all fundamental rights equally,
 fundamental rights represent ethical values which enjoy widespread
consent and acknowledgment under international law, and
 if legislation does not represent these values the judges have to interpret
the laws in the light of the fundamental right anyway.121
These points would seem to hold true for trademark law, too, and will directly
affect the way courts at all levels perceive the relationship between IPR and
fundamental rights. It is also going to affect the way courts balance interests in
concrete cases involving the interpretation of trademark provisions, be that the rules
which determine which signs can be protected, the scope of protection in
infringement cases, or the application of limitations.
Apart from confirming that trademark law is part of this overall trend, it is
submitted that the active step of internalizing fundamental rights into trademark by
the new Recitals is going to accelerate the processes identified by Geiger. This will
most likely not revolutionize EU trademark law. As explained above, the wellknown rules and principles remain in force, and the constitutionalization does not
mandate (nor prescribe) contra legem interpretation of the legislation by courts. Nor
does the development detract the societal value of trademark protection or diminish
119. Schovsbo, supra note 23.
120. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et
Éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. I-12006.
121. GEIGER, supra note 4, at 138 et seq.
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the importance of fair and honest commercial practices. The constitutionalization
does, however, open the door for new arguments and perspective in trademark
cases. As seen from the traditional starting point of the CJEU, above, and its
emphasis on market integration, the inclusion of the non-economic constitutional norms
is going to add to the general softening of the focus of the EU treaty following the
adoption of the Lisbon treaty.122 Furthermore, the explicit internalization of those
norms could well leap-frog any hesitations following from the traditional external/
internal view described above. The effect on national courts will come in part via
the CJEU123 and in part via the national implementation. In both instances, courts
are going to rely on the preamble to cast light on the interpretation of a legal rule.
For courts such as Danish ones, which have traditionally been reluctant to rely on
arguments derived from fundamental rights, this will no doubt make the application
of free speech arguments, etc. more accessible than previously.
B. Concrete Issues
Turning to the most likely concrete effects and the ability of the new
trademark system to address some of the concerns raised, Senftleben has made the
following observations (before the adoption of the new provisions):
In the area of limitations of the scope of trademark protection, the analysis
revealed that with the continuous expansion of trademark protection in the
EU, inherent limits of exclusive rights become less and less reliable safe
harbours for free speech. It has become more difficult to demarcate exactly
the limits of actionable trademark use. Besides forms of use that would
interfere with the essential trademark function of signalling the commercial
origin of goods and services, EU trademark owners may also have success
in invoking trademark rights against forms of use, such as criticism,
comment and parody that do not impair the basic origin function, but may
adversely affect brand image and goodwill. This expansion of trademark
rights is likely to have an increasingly deterrent effect. The mere risk of
being sued for trademark infringement because of a biting comment or
parody may prevent users from engaging in these forms of free speech. To
safeguard freedom of expression, it is thus advisable to reassure users of

122.

Stephen Weatherhill, From Economic Rights to Fundamental Rights, in THE PROTECTION
11 (Sybe de Vries et al. eds., 2013) (pointing
out that the “softening” is in part coursed by the removal from the Treaty of the purpose of creating a
“system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted” (i.e. Article 3(1)(g) of the preLisbon treaty)); see also Davis, supra note 9 (pointing out how the focus of the CJEU on ‘the market’ led
to a lowering of the requirements for considering signs to be distinctive and thus protectable and thus
expanded the reach of trademark law); Stephen Weatherhill, Protecting the Internal Market from the
Charter, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS A BINDING INSTRUMENT: FIVE YEARS
OLD AND GROWING 213 (Sybe de Vries et al. eds., 2015) (pointing out that as seen from the perspective
of Free Movement cases, the Charter has provided “confirmation, not transformation” as the Internal
Market law was already “fundamental rights compliant” at the time of the entry into force of the TFEU).
123. National courts are obliged to refer preliminary questions to the CJEU when in doubt on
the interpretation of EU law. TFEU art. 267 and previous decisions are binding on national courts.
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EU AFTER LISBON
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trademarked signs that certain forms of use are exempted from the control
of the trademark owner by adopting appropriate exceptions that can be
invoked as defences against alleged infringement. In this way, legal certainty
can be re-established, and socially and culturally valuable use can be
encouraged.124
Following this analysis, I will focus my assessment of the impact of the
changes in relation to two issues: (1) demarcation of the limits of actionable
trademark use and (2) limitations as safe harbors for fundamental rights.125
1. Demarcation of the Limits of Actionable Trademark Use
Senftleben has noticed a deterrence effect arising from the actual or perceived
ability of trademark holders to rely on the extended protection offered to marks
with a reputation to successfully invoke trademark rights against forms of use, such
as criticism, comment, and parody that do not impair the basic origin function, but
may adversely affect brand image and goodwill.126
The trademark reform made the extended protection of marks with a reputation
(or “well-known marks”) mandatory (and not optional) for member states.127 In this
way, the new system cast one of the prime examples of the expansion of trademark
law in stone.128 In terms of the substantive rules, no changes occurred. According
to the Directive article 10(2)(c) (Regulation Article 9(2)(c)), holders of such marks
may thus still prevent the use of such marks where such use without due cause takes unfair
advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the EU trademark.
The potential scope of the protection under EU law, for marks with a
reputation, is very broad. Thus, in L’Oréal/Bellure, the Court stated that taking unfair
advantage of a mark with a reputation covers in particular “cases where, by reason
of a transfer of the image of the mark or of the characteristics which it projects to
the goods identified by the identical or similar sign, there is clear exploitation on the
coat-tails of the mark with a reputation.”129 According to this test, the burden of proof
for finding infringement is very light.130 Arguably, the CJEU has so far limited the
application of the “standing on the coattail” test to cases where imitations are

124. Senftleben, supra note 4, at 376.
125. The EU courts have also relied on provisions in the Charter in cases involving trademarks
and procedural matters. See Case T-585/10, Aitic Penteo v. O.H.I.M., 2012 E.C.R. 251 (on the EU
Charter art. 41(2)(c) and the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions); see also
Case C-530/12, O.H.I.M. v. Nat’l Lottery Comm’n, 2014 E.C.R. 186 (on EU Charter art. 47 and fair
trial). I will disregard these decisions in the following and focus instead on substantive trademark law.
126. Senftleben, supra note 4.
127. Trademark Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(2)(c).
128. See supra points 1, 3.2.
129. Case C-487/07, L’Oreal v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185, ¶ 41.
130. The burden for establishing that the use would be detrimental to the distinctive character
of the earlier mark is higher. Case C-252/07, Intel Corp. v. C.P.M. United Kingdom, 2008 E.C.R. 655,
¶ 77 (requiring “evidence of a change in the economic behaviour of the average consumer of the goods
or services for which the earlier mark was registered consequent on the use of the later mark, or a
serious likelihood that such a change will occur in the future”).

Final to Printer_Schovsbo (Do Not Delete)

8/30/2018 10:37 AM

2018] TRADEMARKS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EU

577

offered for sale.131 This reading, however, is open to challenge, and what remains is
a broad and wide area for trademark holders to argue their case. For artists who
include trademarks in artworks which are offered for sale or, for example, NGOs
who use trademarks or parodies to express criticism in ways which involve a
commercial element (e.g., the selling of T-shirts) determining the scope of the
coattail test is complicated and may prevent even beneficial activities. Also,
commercial users who depend on, for example, the rating or the comparing of
companies or who provide general information about products and rely on
trademarks to identify those companies or products could find themselves liable to
infringement suits even beyond the sphere where the use dilutes or harms the
trademarks in question.
In light of the potential broadness of the scope of the protection for wellknown marks, Di Cataldo has pointed to the importance of the balancing potential
of the without-due-cause criterion both in limiting the scope of protection and in
making it clear that the limitations also apply for marks with a reputation.132 If
understood as a separate and negative criterion, it may limit protection by providing
for a counterbalance to the positive criteria in Article 10 (i.e., unfair advantage or
detriment). The role and function of the “due course” requirement is not clear. The
German Supreme Court relied on this criterion for finding the use of a trademark
as a parody to be legal in the light of the artistic freedom (the colour purple used
for Milka chocolate and with a text which alluded ironically to the trademark).133 So
far, however, the CJEU has not devoted much energy to develop this part of the
provision on marks with a reputation. In Leidseplain Beheer, the Court explained that
the purpose of the due course requirement is to help strike a balance between the
interests of third parties and the holder of the trademark.134 Moreover, in Interflora,
the CJEU recognized the use of someone else’s trademark to inform consumers
about alternative offers in the marketplace as falling within the ambit of fair
competition and to constitute a “due cause.” The acceptance was limited, however,
to uses where the third party did not offer “mere imitations” or used the mark in
131. Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237/08 & C-238/08, Google France S.A.R.L. & Google
Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. (C-236/08), Google France S.A.R.L. v. Viaticum S.A. & Luteciel
S.A.R.L. (C-237/08) and Google France S.A.R.L. v. Centre National de Recherche en Relations
Humaines (C.N.R.R.H.) S.A.R.L. & Others (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R. 159, ¶¶ 102–03.
132. Vicenzo Di Cataldo, The Trade Mark with a Reputation in EU Law, 42 INT’L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 833, 833 (2011).
133. Judgment of the German Supreme Court, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht
[OLG Hamm] [German Supreme Court] Feb. 3, 2005, LILA-POSTKARTE, 583, 583 (with
picture). Senftleben, supra note 4, at 364 (pointing out that the court did in fact find the use to be
capable of constituting an infringement, so the “due course” criterion was relied upon as a “last stop”);
see also Judgment of the German Supreme Court, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [OLG
Hamm] [German Supreme Court] Apr. 2, 2015, SPRINGENDER PUDEL, 114 (with pictures) (finding
that the use of a mark depicting a pudel leaping over the word PUDEL infringed PUMA’s well-known
brand, depicting a catlike animal leaping over the word PUMA). The case is distinctly different from
the Lila Postkarte case because the leaping pudel was used commercially and in a way that could lead
to separate trade mark protection if accepted.
134. Case 65/12, Leidseplein Beheer B.V. & Hendrikus de Vries v. Red Bull GmbH & Red Bull
Nederland, 2014 E.C.R. 49 ¶¶ 45–46.
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ways that caused dilution or tarnishment or which adversely affected the functions
of the trademark concerned.135 It is not clear from this decision whether the duecause criterion is to be seen as a separate criterion or whether it is merely factored
into the broader assessment of the admissibility of the use. In future cases from the
CJEU on the understanding of the due-cause criterion, the Court will need to
consider the new Recitals and the reference to fundamental rights (including Article
16 on the Right to conduct a Business) into its assessment. Arguably, these new
perspectives would point towards a robust application of the due cause defence. By
accepting the test as establishing a separate criterion the CJEU would thus, in a very
precise way, enable national courts to engage in the balancing of interest which, as it
has been explained above, constitute the gist of the constitutionalization. Such an
application would thus make it clear that trademark holders have to accept use of
their marks which could be said to take advantage of or be detrimental if such use
is not undue. In this way the new provisions will invite users to indicate their reasons
for the use and courts to conduct a balancing of the involved interests.
For the use of trademarks for the purpose of artistic expression, the first step
in an analysis would normally be to consider whether or not the marks are used “in
the course of trade, in relation to goods or services.”136 For marks which make out
part of the motif in a painting (such as the painting in the Nadia Plesner decision
discussed above) this would normally not be the case. Defining “artistic use” may
be tricky, however. In finding the boundaries, Recital 21 now makes it clear that the
mere existence of a commercial interest should not bring the activity within the
ambit of trademark exclusivity. It thus follows directly from the Recital that uses for
the purpose of artistic expression should be considered as being fair “as long as it
is at the same time in accordance with honest practices in industrial and commercial
matters.”137 The Recital clearly is based on the assumption that artistic use of a
trademark may be in accordance with “honest practices” and thus that even uses
with a commercial element should be accepted as long as they are fair. In finding
those boundaries one may ask whether the courts should begin their analysis from
the perspective of the artist or from the perspective of what is fair as seen from a
commercial point of view. In other words: should the fairness standard be seen as
referring to a market-based conception or to a conception based on the artistic
purpose? Arguably, courts should rely on the latter part of Recital 21 in finding the
balance. According to this part of the Recital “this Regulation should be applied in
135. Case C-323/09, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer Plc, 2011 E.C.R. I-8625, ¶ 91 (“By
contrast, where the advertisement displayed on the internet on the basis of a keyword corresponding
to a trademark with a reputation puts forward – without offering a mere imitation of the goods or
services of the proprietor of that trademark, without causing dilution or tarnishment and without,
moreover, adversely affecting the functions of the trademark concerned – an alternative to the goods
or services of the proprietor of the trademark with a reputation, it must be concluded that such use
falls, as a rule, within the ambit of fair competition in the sector for the goods or services concerned
and is thus not without ‘due cause’ for the purposes of Article 5(2) of Directive 89/104 and Article
9(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94.”).
136. Trademark Directive, supra note 1, art. 10; Regulation, supra note 1, art. 9.
137. Trademark Directive, supra note 1, art. 21 (emphasis added).
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a way that ensures full respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, and in
particular the freedom of expression.”138 Importantly, this part of the Recital does
not contain references to fairness or honest practices. For artistic uses of
trademarks, the combination of these two parts of the Recital would seem to imply
that pure artistic use (i.e., use which is clearly supported by freedom of expression)
should be allowed for even if it contains a commercial element. For example, putting
a painting which uses a trademark as part of its motif on the market for sale would
seem to not fall within the scope of trademark protection if such use can be
defended from an artistic point of view. If, however, a work of art containing a
trademark as an important part of the motive is used in secondary ways, for example
as merchandise or in other commercial and non-artistic ways—such as the use on
the Nadia Plesner case of the Simple Living motif on a T-shirt—trademark
protection may be triggered. In those instances, courts are now instructed by the
Recital to take into account whether the use for the purpose of artistic expression
is fair and in conformity with honest practices.139 If that is not the case, the artist would
violate trademark law if there is a risk of confusion or (for well-known marks) the
use is taking unfair advantage of the mark or is detrimental. Traditional analyses
would often have led to the same results,140 but the Recital is, without any doubt,
going to make it easier for courts to draw the lines and to include the user’s interest
in the assessment too.
A constitutional reading which puts an accent on the freedom to conduct a
business would arguably also make it easier for courts to asses in a comprehensive
way which novel practices should be allowed for as being “inherent in
competition”141 and which should be deemed illegal. Some of these uses would fit
well within the known categories, for example, the use of trademarks in comparative
advertising.142 Other uses would be harder to access such as the use to identify
products known only under the trademark.143 Considering, however, the fast pace
of innovation, it is hard to foresee which novel kinds of uses may emerge. So far,
many of the activities which have challenged trademark law—keywording, metatags,
the use by on-line auction sites etc.—have not relied on trademarks as indications
of commercial origin in the traditional sense but rather as fodder for searching
activities. It is hard to see why future uses would not continue to develop new ways
for trademarks to be used. In order for trademark law to keep up and to deliver legal
solutions which strike the right balance between the legitimate interest of the holder
of rights in marks and of those marks, flexibility is needed. The inclusion of the

138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Senftleben, supra note 4, at 363.
141. Case C-323/09, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer Plc, 2011 E.C.R. I-8625.
142. Directive art. 10(2)(f) (Regulation art. 9(3)(f)) now makes it clear that it constitutes a
trademark infringement to use a sign in comparative advertising in a manner that is contrary to Directive
2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 concerning
misleading and comparative advertising, OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, at 21.
143. Di Cataldo, supra note 132, at 839 et seq. (mentioning the Segway as an example).
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“freedom to conduct a business” standard makes it clear that in finding such
balancing points one should not just include the interests of trademark holders but
also of users in access to use trademarks in their commercial activities.144
2. Limitations as Safe Harbors for Fundamental Rights
Should courts also in trademark cases decide to take their cue from the
Deckmyn-decision145 one could expect them to engage in an open-minded discussion
which recognise the interests of users on the same level as those of trademark
holders. Such an approach would imply a rejection of any a priori assumptions that
limitations and exceptions should be construed narrowly and to the benefit of the
trademark holder.146 This does not mean that courts would automatically interpret
limitations in favour of users. Instead, the new line of arguing would suggest that
users’ interests should be recognized as being of a high-ranking nature to the extent
that they are backed up by fundamental rights interests. This would cover not only
free speech interests but also commercial interests if access is necessary to engage
in normal and fair commercial activity. Concretely, one would expect the framing
of the balancing of interest in Gillette147 to not be continued. Instead of measuring,
the effects as seen from the perspective of the trademark holder only, one would
expect the CJEU and national courts to begin their balancing of interests with empty
scales and to apply the “honest practices” criterion in an open-ended way.
CONCLUSION
As seen from a broader perspective, the new Recitals have confirmed the
development in case law from the CJEU of the growing importance of fundamental
rights to IPR and of the close interrelationship between the two areas of the law.
The constitutionalization identified by Geiger as a means of reining in IPR protection
and placing IPR within a legal framework which focuses on the effects (i.e., costs)
of the protection system as seen from a general societal perspective is now cast in
stone for trademark law. In terms of the future application of trademark law, the
Recitals have clarified the existence of a two-layer framework which combines
open-ended standards from fundamental rights with a catalogue of specific
limitations. On the overall level, this structure is recommendable as it combines
flexibility and clarity to give the courts room of manoeuvre.148

144. See, in the same vein on competition law, supra note 19, and Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo,
Compulsory Licenses and Trade Marks, 34 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 651, 651–53 (2012) (arguing that
access to use the trademark may even warrant the granting of a compulsory license via competition law
to use the mark (if the original function is not jeopardized)).
145. Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen et al., ECLI: EU:C:2014:2132 at 2.1, 4.1.1.
146. See GEIGER, supra note 4, at 146 et seq.
147. Case C-228/03, Gillette Company v. LA-Laboratories Ltd., 2005 E.C.R. I-2337 at 3.2.
148. RAMSEY & SCHOVSBO, supra note 4 (pointing out that already under the existing
“constitutionalization,” this is the model preferred by the EU and that a similar position is emerging in
US trademark law and recommending the approach on an international level).
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The new Recitals are not going to revolutionize EU trademark. They are,
however, going to have an effect even beyond the outlier cases where trademark
law and fundamental rights come head to head. For those cases—which are
important—the Recitals will provide clarity and help relieve any chilling effects
stemming from the practices of aggressive trademark holders. More generally, the
inclusion of fundamental rights norms into trademark legal analysis is going to
enable parties and courts to broaden the scope of their arguments to go beyond the
traditional trademark values in undistorted competition and the free movement of
goods. These values will continue to be important for future cases, but it is now
clear that they do not stand alone and that courts should, in drawing the lines for
what is actionable or not under trademark law, recognize users’ interests in access
to use protected marks when appropriate. This will, in turn, most likely mean that
the broad and open-ended provisions of trademark law will become more
important. In particular, the provisions on due cause and on honest practices are very
susceptible to broader and value-based arguments and are most likely going to be
relied upon both by the CJEU and national courts in a more pronounced way in
future case law. Even other open-ended provisions such as the requirement that a
sign must be “distinctive” is inviting arguments, and one could well imagine that,
for example, a claim that a certain sign should not be protected since it has general
importance as being of “cultural significance”149 could be backed up with a
reference to fundamental rights, and that access to this sign should remain free to
not unreasonably restrict free speech or commercial freedom.150 In this way, the
overall effects of the constitutionalization are most likely going to be a trademark
system which is going to put more emphasis on aspects of (un)fairness of the use of
marks than on the protection of investments of trademark holders. Depending on
the future development and the room the CJEU decides to leave to national courts
to develop the potential of the balancing principle and to factor the fundamental
rights concerns into the analysis of national trademark provisions, Recital 21 may
serve as “national correction mechanisms”151 to the harmonized trademark
provisions. Unlike unfair marketing law, which many EU countries have used to
supplement the protection afforded by the national trademark, Acts to prevent
certain unfair uses or to protect signs not covered by the harmonized trademark
rules the fundamental rights cannot be derogated by EU harmonization. Because of
their high-ranking nature, they are resilient and bind both national and EU
legislators and courts.

149.
150.
151.

Senftleben, supra note 4, at 356, 358 et seq.
See GEIGER, supra note 4, at 148 et seq.
Kur, supra note 55, at 453.

